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Lustigman v. Harris Publications, Inc.: New York Supreme Court
permits an at-will employee to maintain a cause of action for
fraudulent inducement against the employer.
An irrefutable aspect of the at-will employment doctrine is
that an employer has the unfettered right to discharge an em-
ployee for any cause,' unless this right is limited by some other
means 2 or the employer's actions fall within the parameters of an
' See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 506 N.E.2d 919, 920,
514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211 (1987) (stating that absent agreements to contrary, any at-
will employee may be terminated at any time); Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1983) (stating
that where employment is for indefinite time, it is terminable at any time for any or
no reason). The right to terminate unilaterally the employment relationship for any
or no cause is a right of both the employer and employee. See Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at
300, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235; see also Sabetay, 69 N.Y.2d at 333, 506
N.E.2d at 920, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 211; Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Employee
Handbooks: Risks and Rewards, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 3 (stating that absent
agreement for specific duration, employer and employee may terminate relationship
at any time for any reason with or without notice).
2 One way to limit the employer's right to terminate an at-will employee is
through the existence of an express provision in an employment manual or hand-
book. See Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 305, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237
(discussing fact that employee may be limited in termination rights by express pro-
visions in handbook); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 466, 443 N.E.2d
441, 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198 (1982) (noting that at-will presumption can be re-
butted by "'circumstances showing different intention! ") (citations omitted); see also
Klein & Pappas, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing implications to employer for failing to
comply with handbook policies). Weiner established a high standard to meet for
employees alleging an employer's manual effectively reflects an intent to restrict the
right to terminate only for just cause. See Sabetay, 69 N.Y.2d at 334-35, 506 N.E.2d
at 921-22, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 212 (noting "because of the explicit and difficult pleading
burden, post-Weiner plaintiffs alleging wrongful discharge have not fared well"); see
also Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., Ten Years After, 19
WESTCHESTER B. J. 227, 234 (1992) (remarking that "[slince the Sabetay decision,
the overwhelming majority of New York State court cases have rejected causes of
action based on Weiner."); Klein & Pappas, supra note 1, at 3 (indicating some New
York courts have limited Weiner to facts). First, the employee must show he/she was
induced to leave his/her previous employment by the assurance that he/she would
only be terminated for cause. See Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457
N.Y.S.2d at 197. Second, the employee must demonstrate that the employer's
"assurance was incorporated into the employment application." Id. Third, the em-
ployee must prove that in reliance on the assurance, he/she turned down other em-
ployment opportunities. Id. Finally, the employee must demonstrate that he/she
was instructed to follow strictly the procedures outlined in the employee manual. Id.
at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. Subsequent courts have inter-
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anti-discrimination statute.3 When an individual is hired for an
indefinite term, the presumption of at-will employment arises.4
The consequence of this presumption is that an at-will employee
has no cause of action for breach of contract when the employer
terminates or modifies the employment relationship.5 New York
continues to be a strong at-will employment state.6 While other
preted the fourth element to mean that the employment manual must contain an
express just cause termination provision. See Sabetay, 69 N.Y.2d at 336, 506 N.E.2d
at 922-23, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 213 (finding that limitation in employee handbook on
employer's right to discharge must be expressly stated).
'See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-87 (1994)
(providing eligible employees with total of 12 weeks paid or unpaid leave); National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994) (regulating unfair labor practices by
employers and discussing employees' rights); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994) (discussing wage regulations); Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act §§ 4, 12, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (1994) (prohibiting covered employers
from discriminating against employees who are at least 40 years old); Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (proscribing employ-
ment discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1994) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
2000e to include pregnancy within sex discrimination); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (providing that employer of 15 or more
employees cannot discriminate against "a qualified individual with a disability be-
cause of the disability"); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1997)
(detailing unlawful discriminatory practices); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney Supp.
1997) (providing limited protection to whistle-blowing employees). For more discus-
sion of New York's very limited whistle-blowing statute, see Remba v. Federation
Employment and Guidance Servs., 149 A.D.2d 131, 134-35, 545 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142
(1st Dep't 1989) (indicating whistle-blower statute does not apply to employers'
white collar crime), af'd, 76 N.Y.2d 801, 559 N.E.2d 655, 559 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1990);
Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169, 180, 548 N.Y.S.2d 513, 520 (2d
Dep't 1989) (noting that Labor Law § 740 protects employees from retaliation for
disclosing or threatening to disclose employer's activities that are "a substantial and
specific danger to the public health or safety").
4 Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 300, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
' See Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 159, 156 N.E.2d 297, 298, 182 N.Y.S.2d
577, 579 (1959) (holding that plaintiff has no cause of action for breach of contract
since employment contract was terminable at-will); Martin v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895) (adopting Wood rule which states
that general hiring, without time of employment specified, is indefinite hiring and
therefore terminable at-will).
6 See Laurie P. Cohen & Wade Lambert, Firms'Right to Fire "At-Will'Is Bol-
stered, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1990, at B3, available in 1990 WL-WSJ 593706 (stating
that "New York has tended to favor the right of employers to terminate employees
'at-will'"); Michael G. Radigan, Avoiding Wrongful Discharge Actions, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 4, 1994, at S1 (indicating that employers "can take comfort in the New York
courts' general adherence to the traditional rule of at-will employment, which has
been substantially vitiated in many other states"); Richard J. Reibstein, The Emer-
gence of Truth in Hiring' Claims, N.Y. L.J., May 19, 1993, at 1 (noting that at-will
employment doctrine is "firmly entrenched in New York").
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states have vitiated the doctrine with the recognition of signifi-
cant exceptions, New York has continuously refused to do so.' In
accordance with this traditional adherence to the employment
7 Numerous other states have recognized three main exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine. These exceptions are: (1) violation of public policy; (2) implied
contract; and (3) implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See James L. Payne
& Kevin M. Smith, Establishing the Boundaries of Wrongful Discharge: California's
Foley Decision, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 3547, June 22, 1989, available in 1989
WL 2419561 (indicating that, as of 1988, 34 states recognized public policy excep-
tion, 32 states recognized implied contract exception, and 13 states recognized im-
plied covenant exception); see also Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-
Dismissal Legislation in the United States, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 644, July 1,
1991, available in 1991 WL 2813484 (providing table of exceptions and year in
which particular states adopted exception). Despite the developments in other
states, the New York Court of Appeals has continually refused to recognize the tort
of abusive or wrongful discharge, see Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 89,
461 N.Y.S.2d at 236, an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, id. at 304-
05, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237, and public policy exceptions, id. at 301-2,
448 N.E.2d at 89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36; see also Klein & Pappas, supra note 1,
at 3 (stating that New York has refused to expand employer's liability to at-will
employees). The court's rationale for denying recognition of these exceptions is that
the legislature is better equipped to make such decisions. Sabetay, 69 N.Y.2d at 336,
506 N.E.2d at 923, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 213; Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 301, 448 N.E.2d at
89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235. But cf N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney Supp.
1997) (prohibiting retaliatory firing by public employers); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997) (creating general prohibition of invidious discrimi-
nation in employment); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney 1997) (prohibiting employ-
ers from firing employees due to jury service); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 215, 740 (McKinney
Supp. 1997) (crafting whistle-blower statute).
In addition to the three main exceptions to employment at-will, some states
permit the employee to assert promissory estoppel in order to defeat the employer's
statute of frauds defense. See Pickell v. Arizona Components Co., 902 P.2d 392, 395
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that at-will employee may have claim for promissory
estoppel), rev'd on other grounds, 1997 WL 27173 (Colo. 1997). But see Cunnison v.
Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc., 107 A.D.2d 50, 53, 485 N.Y.S.2d 272, 276 (1st
Dep't 1985) (stating change of job does not alone create presumption of promissory
estoppel); Ginsberg v. Fairfield-Noble Corp., 81 A.D.2d 318, 321, 440 N.Y.S.2d 222,
225 (1st Dep't 1981) (holding change ofjob does not necessarily implicate promissory
estoppel).
One important, but narrow, exception that New York does permit is found in
Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 609 N.E.2d 105, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1992). In Wieder,
the Court of Appeals held that there is an implied understanding between a law
firm and an associate that each will comply with the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility reporting requirements. Id. at 635-36, 609 N.E.2d at 108-09, 593 N.Y.S.2d at
755-56. Due to this implied contractual provision, an associate who was discharged
for insisting on reporting professional misconduct had a valid breach of contract
claim. Id. at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757. For a brief discussion on
Wieder's possible application to other professionals, see Sandra J. Mullings, Wieder
v. Skala: A Chink in the Armor of the At-Will Doctrine or a Lance for Law Firm As-
sociates?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 963, 992 (1995) (asserting that Wieder should be
applied to other professions which are subject to standards of conduct and rules of
ethics).
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at-will rule, New York courts have been reluctant to permit an
employee to maintain a lawsuit upon theories of either fraudu-
lent inducement or intentional misrepresentation.8 Neverthe-
less, in Lustigman v. Harris Publications, Inc.,' the New York
State Supreme Court, New York County permitted a fraudulent
inducement claim to stand by denying an employer's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.' °
In Lustigman, the defendant ("Harris Publications") began
recruiting the plaintiff ("Lustigman") in May of 1995 for the po-
sition of editor-in-chief of the magazine Outdoor Gear." Accord-
ing to Lustigman, a Harris Publications representative inten-
tionally misrepresented that sufficient financial resources had
been set aside to publish the magazine for one year. 2 Upon expi-
ration of the one-year trial period, the viability of the magazine
was to be evaluated." Lustigman accepted the offer of employ-
ment, but less than two months later Harris Publications sus-
pended the issuance of the magazine and discharged her.'4
Lustigman subsequently commenced an action alleging breach of
contract and fraudulent inducement to enter into the employ-
ment relationship. 5 Thereafter, Harris Publications brought a
8 See Dalton v. Union Bank of Switzerland, 134 A.D.2d 174, 176, 520 N.Y.S.2d
764, 766 (1st Dep't 1987) (holding that plaintiff stated no cause of action for fraudu-
lent misrepresentation because it was "restatement of the first cause of action for
breach of contract"); Brumbach v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 126 A.D.2d 841, 843,
510 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (3d Dep't 1987) (stating that fraud cannot be basis for sepa-
rate cause of action because alleged fraud directly related to breach of contract
claim); Kotick v. Desai, 123 A.D.2d 744, 746, 507 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (2d Dep't 1986)
(noting that "addition[al] allegation[s] of scienter will not transform a breach of con-
tract action into one to recover damages for fraud"). But see Navaretta v. Group
Health, Inc., 191 A.D.2d 953, 954, 595 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840 (3d Dep't 1993)
(recognizing at-will employee's cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation);
Backer v. Lewit, 180 A.D.2d 134, 139, 584 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483 (1st Dep't 1992)
(holding that at-will employee could maintain cause of action for fraud); see also
Monaco v. Saint Mary's Hosp. of Troy, Inc., 184 A.D.2d 985, 985-86, 585 N.Y.S.2d
589, 590 (3d Dep't 1992) (implying that at-will employee can maintain action for
fraudulent misrepresentation).
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1996, at 28, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996).
10 Id.
11 Id.
1id.
13 Id.
14 Lustigman, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1996, at 28, col. 3.
16 Id. Lustigman brought four other causes of action. Id. The first cause of action
was breach of contract. Id. The breach of contract claim was found to be barred by
the statute of frauds because the duration of the oral agreement was alleged to be
one year. Id. Another cause of action advanced by Lustigman was for negligent mis-
representation. Id. at 28, col. 4. This claim was dismissed, however, because it
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motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, arguing
that the breach of contract claim was barred and that the
fraudulent inducement claim is not an acknowledged cause of
action in the realm of at-will employment. Furthermore, the de-
fendant contended that even if the cause of action existed,
Lustigman failed to allege that the misstatements addressed ex-
isting facts, rather than mere future expectations.16
Relying on the Third Department's decision in Navaretta v.
Group Health, Inc.,'7 the Lustigman court found that although
the statute of frauds barred the breach of contract claim, 8
Lustigman sufficiently alleged a cause of action for fraudulent
inducement. 9  Specifically, Lustigman alleged: (1) that Harris
Publications had told her that the magazine had the necessary
financial resources to publish for at least one year;" (2) that
Harris Publications had no intention of publishing the magazine
for this length of time;2 and (3) that Lustigman relied to her
detriment on the misrepresentations when she decided to quit
lacked the primary element that there be a "special relationship between plaintiff
and defendant." Id. Lustigman also brought a claim to recover damage to her career
and professional reputation. Id. Justice Lobis dismissed this cause of action because
it was incorporated in the fraudulent inducement claim. Id. Lastly, the court re-
fused to dismiss the last cause of action for quantum meruit. Id.
'6 Lustigman, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1996, at 28, col. 3.
'7 191 A.D.2d 953, 595 N.Y.S.2d 839 (3d Dep't 1993). In Navaretta, the employer
informed the prospective employee, during the.interview phase, that part of the
training would involve certain tests. Id. at 953, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 840. The plaintiff
expressed concern over the examinations because "she did not test well." Id. The in-
terviewer instructed her "not to worry" because the tests were unimportant. Id. In
fact, the tests were "pivotal" to employment. Id. The plaintiff quit her former job
and subsequently went to work for the defendant employer. Id. After the plaintiff
failed three examinations, she was discharged. Id. The Third Department stated
that despite the plaintiffs at-will employee status,
she [was] not suing defendant based on a breach of her employment con-
tract but on a tort claim that defendantfs agent fraudulently misrepre-
sented facts to induce her into entering into employment.... Such a cause of
action is cognizable if specific enough ... and if the plaintiff alleges mis-
statements of existing fact as opposed to expressions of future expectation.
Id. at 954, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 840 (citations omitted).
'8 Lustdgman, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1996, at 28, col. 3 (stating that breach of con-
tract claim was barred by statute of frauds because contract duration was alleged to
be one year). The New York statute of frauds generally provides that any agree-
ment, promise, or undertaking which is not by its terms to be performed within one
year from its making is void unless it is in a signed writing. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
5-701(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
" Lustigman, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1996, at 28, col. 3.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 28, col. 4.
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her previous job in order to join the defendant's organization.'
The court carefully noted the distinction between a claim that
the defendant breached a contract to employ her for a year and a
claim that the defendant misrepresented that the magazine
would be published for one year.'
While the decision to permit the cause of action for fraudu-
lent inducement in Lustigman was unconventional in New York,
many other state courts have acknowledged the claim in similar
circumstances.' The employer's misrepresentation of existing
fact concerning a material aspect of the position in conjunction
with the subsequent enticement of the plaintiff to rely detrimen-
tally on the misstatement by accepting the employment offer
constitute the gravamen of the fraudulent inducement theory.'
Alternatively, an employer may be liable under this theory when
the employer fraudulently coaxes a current at-will employee to
22 Id.
23 Id.
24See Kidder v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 639 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Ala. 1994) (holding
that at-will employee could maintain action for fraudulent inducement against em-
ployer based upon alleged misrepresentations made prior to accepting employment);
Interstate Freeway Servs., Inc. v. Houser, 835 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Ark 1992) (holding
that employer was deceitful when it hired plaintiff to "do the initial hard work of
opening the restaurant with the hidden intent of installing his own workers ... after
the initial start-up work had been completed"); Lazar v. Superior Ct., 909 P.2d 981,
985 (Cal. 1996) (holding that employers who wrongfully terminate at-will employees
should not be immune from tort liability); Plane v. Uniforce MIS Servs. of Georgia,
Inc., 479 S.E.2d 18, 19, 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed as to intentional misrepresentation and fraud when employer alleg-
edly falsely told prospective employee that it secured consulting contract with an-
other organization in order to induce him to accept its employment offer); Johnson
v. George J. Ball, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1355, 1361, 1363 (III. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that
cause of action for fraudulent inducement can be maintained); Webber v. Frelonic
Corp., No. 92-1437, 1994 WL 878830, at *4 (Mass. Oct. 7, 1994) ("An action for neg-
ligent or fraudulent misrepresentation stands separately from any breach of con-
tract claim."); Stowman v. Carlson Co., 430 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(implying that at-will employee may have cause of action based on fraudulent in-
ducement); see also Deborah S. Adams & David A. Skidmore, Jr., Employees May
Recover for Businesses' Broken Promises, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1996, at B7
(discussing potential cause of action based on fraudulent inducement). But see
Mehling v. Dubois Cty Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n., 601 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that permitting at-will employees to maintain fraudulent inducement
claims would, in effect, permit circumvention of statute of frauds); Whiteco Indus.,
v. Kopani, 514 N.E.2d 840, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (indicating no claim of fraudu-
lent inducement may be brought by at-will employees).
"See Adams & Skidmore, Jr., supra note 24, at B7 ("Under this theory, an em-
ployer can be held liable for lying to a prospective employee about an important as-
pect of a job if the employee detrimentally relies upon the promise by taking the
job.-).
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remain with the organization after the employee has received of-
fers of superior employment opportunities."
The Lustigman court correctly denied the employer's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Although New
York courts historically have declined to acknowledge the
fraudulent inducement claim by at-will employees, based on the
view that such claim merely represents a change in form rather
than substance,27 there are inherent distinctions between breach
of contract and fraudulent inducement claims.'
Fraudulent inducement is a tort completely independent of a
breach of contract claim.29 The most significant demarcation be-
tween the two causes of action remains the notion that efficient
breaches of contract are encouraged,0 while fraud is morally rep-
rehensible.31 The elements necessary to establish a prima facie
21 See Cole v. Kobs & Draft Adver., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 220, 223, 225 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (indicating that suit not barred after plaintiff informed supervisor of intention
to accept competitor's offer and supervisor strongly advised plaintiff to accept coun-
teroffer of salary increase, promotions, and "a great future"); Gamier v. J.C. Penney
Co., 863 F. Supp. 139, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying employer's motion for summary
judgment of employee's claim of fraudulent inducement to remain in defendant's
employ); Shaddix v. United Ins. Co. of America, 678 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995) (stating that plaintiff was induced by "certain company employees" to
remain with current employer). But see Garwood v. Sheen & Shine, Inc., 175 A-D.2d
569, 570, 572 N.Y.S.2d 237, 237-38 (4th Dep't 1991) (holding that current employee
could not maintain cause of action for fraudulent inducement).
27See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing New York courts' ad-
versity toward causes of action based on fraudulent inducement).
28 See Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[Ulnder
New York law 'lilt is elementary that where a contract or transaction was induced
by false representations, the representations and the contract are distinct and sepa-
rable .... Thus, fraud in the inducement of a written contract is not merged therein
so as to preclude an action for fraud.'") (quoting 60 N.Y. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit §
206, at 740 (1987)).
29See Lazar v. Superior Ct., 900 P.2d 981, 985 (Cal. 1996) (stating that
"plaintiffs claim does not depend upon whether the defendant's promise is ulti-
mately enforceable as a contract. 'If it is enforceable, the [plaintiff] ... has a cause of
action in tort as an alternative at least .... '") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 530(1), cmt. c (1976)); see also Dalton v. Union Bank of Switzerland, 134
A.D.2d 174, 176, 520 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (Ist Dep't 1987) (stating fraud that relates to
breach of employment contract is not valid claim).
:0 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 31-38
(2d ed. 1989) (providing examples in which breaches are efficient); see also RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1, at 89-96 (4th ed. 1992) (examining
role of economics in contract law).
3' See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAw § 273-a (McKinney 1990) (fraudulent convey-
ances by insolvents); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 274 (McKinney 1990) (fraudulent
conveyances by business persons); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 275 (McKinney 1990)
(fraudulent conveyances by persons about to incur debt); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§
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case of fraudulent inducement include: (1) a material misrepre-
sentation by the defendant; (2) falsity of the statement; (3)
knowledge by the defendant that the statement was false; (4)
detrimental reliance by the plaintiff on the misstatement; and
(5) injury to the plaintiff.32
The first and third elements will be the most difficult obsta-
cles for disgruntled employees to overcome. With respect to the
first element, the misstatements must be comprised of "existing
fact" or collateral misrepresentations to be actionable;33 mere
"expressions of future expectations" or promissory misrepresen-
tations will not support a fraud claim.' The Lustigman case il-
349, 350, 399-p(9) (McKinney 1988) (proscribing false advertising and other decep-
tive acts); N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 158 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (welfare fraud); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 165.20 (McKinney 1988) (fraudulently obtaining signature); N.Y.
PENAL LAW art. 170 (McKinney 1988) (forgery); N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 176 (McKinney
1988) (insurance fraud); N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 190 (McKinney 1988) (other frauds);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 145-b(2) (McKinney 1992) (Medicaid fraud); N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW § 96 (McKinney 1994) (penalties for fraudulent practices); N.Y. WoRm
COMP. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1994) (penalties for false representations); see also La-
zar v. Superior Ct., 909 P.2d 981, 990 (Cal. 1996) ("In pursuing a valid fraud action,
a plaintiff advances the public interest in punishing intentional misrepresentations
and in deterring such misrepresentations in the future."); Applebaum v. Applebaum,
84 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948) ("[Flraud ... is criminal in its es-
sence and involves moral turpitude at least ....").
32 See Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 403, 407,
151 N.E.2d 833, 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262 (1958).
The essential constituents of the action [for fraud] are fixed as representa-
tion of a material existing fact, falsity, scienter, deception and injury ....
Accordingly, one 'who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of intention
for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance
thereon in a business transaction' is liable for the harm caused by the
other's justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
Id. at 407, 151 N.E.2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (citations omitted); see also John-
son v. George J. Ball, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1355, 1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (recognizing
that plaintiff would not have entered into contract but for misrepresentation).
Channel Master, 4 N.Y.2d at 407, 151 N.E.2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 262; see
also George N. Stepaniuk, Note, The Statute of Frauds as a Bar to an Action in Tort
for Fraud, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1231, 1251 n.122 (1985) (describing collateral mis-
representation as containing "a condition necessary to performance of the underly-
ing contract").
3 Channel Master, 4 N.Y.2d at 407, 151 N.E.2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 262; see
also Cleffi v. Crescent Beach Club, 222 A.D.2d 642, 643, 636 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103 (2d
Dep't 1995) (holding that plaintiflfemployee cannot maintain fraud action when it "is
premised upon breach of contractual duties and the allegations supporting the ac-
tion do not concern representations which are collateral or extraneous to the agree-
ment"); Guterman v. RGA Accessories, Inc., 196 A.D.2d 785, 786, 602 N.Y.S.2d 116,
117-18 (1st Dep't 1993) (same).
There is one situation in which a promise of future performance can be action-
able under fraudulent inducement. "While '[inhere promissory statements as to what
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lustrates the difference between the two forms of misrepresen-
tation. The collateral misrepresentation of existing fact occurred
when Harris Publications informed Lustigman that the corpora-
tion had committed the necessary financial resources to publish
the magazine for a one-year trial period." In contrast, the
promissory misrepresentation was that Harris Publications
would employ Lustigman for one year. 6 The maintenance of a
fraudulent inducement claim hinges on this crucial distinction.
Only the collateral misrepresentation gives rise to the fraudulent
inducement claim because the collateral misrepresentation was
not a term of the 'contract' voided by the statute of frauds."
Thus, if an employee's claim contains only allegations of promis-
sory misrepresentations, no cause of action for fraudulent in-
will be done in the future are not actionable', ... if a promise was actually made with
a preconceived and undisclosed intention of not performing it," a fraudulent in-
ducement action may lie. Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 160, 143 N.E.2d 906, 908,
164 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (1957).
"Compare Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating
that law firm's misrepresentation that it "had recently secured a large environ-
mental law client" and "was in the process of establishing an environmental law de-
partment" were collateral misrepresentations), and Channel Master, 4 N.Y.2d at
407, 151 N.E.2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (noting seller of goods told buyer it had
"'available and uncommitted supplies and productive capacity of aluminum ingot' "
and "had entered into no binding commitments which could in the future reduce
such" supplies), and Urban Holding Corp. v. Haberman, 162 A.D.2d 230, 231, 556
N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (1st Dep't 1990) (reinstating defendant's counterclaim for
fraudulent inducement because "[defendant's] allegations do not relate solely to con-
tractual obligations ... they clearly regard alleged deceptions which occurred previ-
ous to the formation of contracts"), with Garwood v. Sheen & Shine, Inc., 175 A.D.2d
569, 569-70, 572 N.Y.S.2d 237, 237 (4th Dep't 1991) (stating employer told employee
"that he was satisfied with the plaintiffs job performance and would continue the
plaintiff as an employee as long as plaintiff performed his job"), and Brumbach v.
Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 126 A.D.2d 841, 843, 510 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (3d Dep't
1987) (noting university representation to professor that she was "tenure-tracked"
was not statement of existing fact "but rather one of a possible future contingency").
3' Cf. Stewart, 976 F.2d at 89 (stating that law firm's misrepresentations to pro-
spective employee during recruiting that she "would head the environmental law
department" and "[would] be expected to service the firm's substantial existing envi-
ronmental law client" were merely promissory misrepresentations); Channel Mas-
ter, 4 N.Y.2d at 407, 151 N.E.2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (relating that seller told
buyer "it was its intention to make available and to sell to the [buyer] the number of
pounds specified for a period of five years").
" See Stewart, 976 F.2d at 88 (recognizing that "where a contract or transaction
was induced by false representations, the representations and the contract are dis-
tinct"); Channel Master, 4 N.Y.2d at 408, 151 N.E.2d at 836, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 263
(asserting that deliberate, oral misrepresentation of fact is actionable); Stepaniuk,
supra note 32, at 1251 (arguing that plaintiff who can prove misrepresentations
collateral to oral promise should be allowed recovery).
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ducement exists because such a claim would simply be a re-
statement of the previously barred breach of contract cause of
action."8
The other difficult element necessary to establish a prima
facie fraudulent inducement claim is that of scienter, which re-
quires the defendant to have made the misrepresentation with
knowledge of its falsity.39 During the pleading stage, the plaintiff
must state these facts with particularity in the complaint.0
During litigation, the inclusion of the scienter element becomes
even more crucial because plaintiffs often encounter difficulties
in proving fraudulent intent.41 A plaintiff shoulders this burden
of having to prove scienter by the clear and convincing stan-
dard." Consequently, the plaintiff is compelled to produce evi-
dence which clearly contradicts any assertion that the speaker
had no knowledge the misstatement was false.
The remaining elements of a fraudulent inducement claim
also hinder the ability to make out a prima facie case, but these
elements are much easier to surmount. First, plaintiffs must
show that they reasonably relied on the misrepresentations to
their detriment. This reasonable reliance component relates
Channel Master, 4 N.Y.2d at 408, 151 N.E.2d at 836, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 263; see
Stepaniuk, supra note 33, at 1251-52 n.122 (recognizing that under approach in
Channel, proof of collateral misrepresentation entitles plaintiff to recover full extent
of damages, while "fraudulent nonperformance of an oral promise" limits plaintiffs
recovery to incurred pecuniary loss). Clearly, if the employer in Lustigman never
represented that it had set aside the financial resources, but only promised to em-
ploy the plaintiff for one year, there would be no cause of action for fraudulent in-
ducement. The reason is that the words 'I will employ you for one year' are both
promissory misrepresentations and essential terms of the employment contract that
is void under the statute of frauds. Hence, these words cannot support a fraud
claim.
39 See Channel Master, 4 N.Y.2d at 407, 151 N.E.2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 262
(acknowledging that assertion of present intention qualifies as statement of
"material existing fact, sufficient to support a fraud action").
40 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016(b) (McKinney 1991) ("Where a cause of action or defense is
based upon misrepresentation, fraud ... the circumstances constituting the wrong
shall be stated in detail.").
41 See, e.g., Sanyo Electric, Inc. v. Pinros & Gar Corp., 174 A.D.2d 452, 453, 571
N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (1st Dep't 1991) (finding that plaintiff failed to show fraudulent
intent).
42 Plaintiffs bringing a claim for fraud, or fraudulent inducement, must prove
their case by clear and convincing evidence, and not simply by a preponderance of
the evidence. See Sorbaro Co. v. Capital Video Corp., 168 Misc. 2d 143, 148, 646
N.Y.S.2d 445, 449 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1996) (finding that plaintiff sustained
requisite burden of proof); Applebaum v. Applebaum, 84 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1948) (asserting that "presumption of honesty prevails unless over-
come by irresistible evidence").
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back to the distinction between collateral and promissory mis-
representations. Reliance on collateral misrepresentations will
satisfy the reasonableness requirement.' In contrast, reliance
on promissory misrepresentations will not reasonable because
such misrepresentations deal with expressions of future expec-
tations." In addition, an employee wishing to establish a prima
facie case must show damages.45 While the traditional types of
damages awarded to tort victims include punitive damages, a
victim of fraudulent inducement should be able to recover only
compensatory damages." The primary reason behind the exclu-
sion of punitive damages is that fraudulent inducement impli-
cates a private, not public, wrong."' Comformably, an employer
who wrongfully induces a prospective employee to reject other of-
fers of employment should not be ordered to pay punitive dam-
ages." Finally, an employee deciding to sue on the fraudulent
inducement theory faces both the stricter pleading require-
ments49 and the higher burden of proof associated with claims of
4 See Channel Master, 4 N.Y.2d at 407-09, 151 N.E.2d at 385-86, 176 N.Y.S.2d
at 261-63 (explaining statement that something was to be done made by person who
lacked intention to follow through is actionable).
" See Bower v. Atlis Sys., Inc., 182 A.D.2d 951, 953, 582 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (3d
Dep't 1992) (classifying defendant's assurance of employment as "expression of fu-
ture expectation" and not as "impartation of false information"); Golden v. Donna
Karan Co., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1995, at 27, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995) (denying
recovery based on fraud due to absence ofjustifiable reliance on oral promise).
4 Channel Master, 4 N.Y.2d at 407, 151 N.E.2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
48 See Navaretta v. Group Health, Inc., 191 A.D.2d 953, 955, 595 N.Y.S.2d 839,
841 (3d Dep't 1993) (stating that employee "could conceivably recover for loss of
benefits and salary connected with her former employment, as opposed to that
which she would have received if her employment with defendant had continued");
Backer v. Lewit, 180 A.D.2d 134, 140, 584 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483 (1st Dep't 1992)
(holding that plaintiff can recover compensatory damages).
41 See, e.g., Kelly v. DeFoe Corp., 223 A.D.2d 529, 529, 636 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (2d
Dep't 1996) ("It is well settled that punitive damages may not be awarded to redress
a private wrong, and, accordingly, that such damages are not available 'in the ordi-
nary fraud and deceit case.' ") (citations omitted). In an action for fraud, punitive
damages may only be awarded if the fraud was gross, directed at the general public,
and involved a high degree of moral culpability. Id.
's See Backer, 180 A.D.2d at 139, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 483 (holding that fraudulent
inducement "is not a case for punitive damages"); Lustigman v. Harris Publications,
Inc., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1996, at 28, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996) (striking
plaintiffs punitive damage claim because complaint alleged only private wrong). But
see Reibstein, supra note 6, at 1 (citing Colorado and Connecticut cases awarding
$450,000 and $10.1 million respectively, including punitive damages).
9 See Cleffi v. Crescent Beach Club, 222 A.D.2d 642, 643, 636 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103
(2d Dep't 1995) ("plaintiffs allegations of fraud are merely conclusory in nature");
accord Lazar v. Superior Ct., 909 P.2d 981, 988 (Cal. 1996) (pointing out that per-
mitting fraudulent inducement claim does not create potential tort liability in every
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this sort." Together, these elements should prevent parties from
commencing frivolous actions.
The numerous burdens placed upon a plaintiff alleging
fraudulent inducement should alleviate concerns that the recog-
nition of an at-will employee's right to sue the employer under
this theory will result in a further erosion of the at-will employ-
ment doctrine.5' The unencumbered right of the employer to
terminate an at-will employee will not be affected by the recog-
nition of the fraudulent inducement or misrepresentation claim.
52
The crux of the fraudulent inducement theory lies in the manner
and method the employer utilizes in recruiting the employee,53
termination case because fraud must be specifically pleaded); see also William L.
Kandel & Lloyd C. Loomis, Fraud Claims and the Employment Relationship: The
Unsettling Resurgence of a Tort, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J., Sept. 1, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 10191747 (noting that "o]ut of a sense of fairness to defendants, the law
imposes safeguards which make fraud difficult to plead or prove"). But see David
Faustman, State Supreme Court Is Still Micromanaging Employer-Worker Issues,
BUS. J. (San Jose), June 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10047255 (opining that La-
zar decision "blows a mile-wide hole in the protection erected ... from allegations of
unlimited tort damages. Fraud is easy to allege, and often difficult to disprove."). As
to any slippery slope arguments that could be made, it has been stated that the
Court of Appeals "has rejected as a ground for denying a cause of action that there
will be a proliferation of claims. It suffices that if a cognizable wrong has been
committed that there must be a remedy .... " Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 314, 448 N.E.2d 86, 97, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 243 (1983) (Meyer,
J., dissenting) (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554,
558, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422).
0 See supra note 39-42 and accompanying text (noting plaintiffs burden of proof
in maintaining cause of action for fraud).
"' The at-will employee's cause of action for fraudulent inducement and un-
founded breach of contract claim might be based on the same promise. See Kandel &
Loomis, supra note 49 at "1. In the fraudulent inducement claim, the misrepresen-
tation was made "with a preconceived and undisclosed intent not to perform" and
the injury to the employee occurred prior to employment. Id. In the non-existent
breach of contract claim, however, the employee would allege his or her termination
from employment was wrongful based on a statement of future expectation that did
not materialize. Id.
'2 See Pickell v. Arizona Components Co., 902 P.2d 392, 398 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994) ("A claim for fraudulent inducement to contract may be asserted in an at-will
employment situation because it is not inconsistent with the employer's right to
terminate the employment at any time."), rev'd on other grounds, 1997 WL 27173
(Colo. 1997); see also supra note 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing distinction
between breach of contract and misrepresentation).
5' See Lazar, 909 P.2d at 986 (noting that misrepresentation made for fraudu-
lent inducement claim is "designed to induce the employee to alter detrimentally his
or her position in some other respect" and is not "aimed at effecting his termination
... of employment"); see also Gilbert M. Roman, Misrepresentations Can Cost Em-
ployers Plenty, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 31, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7563334
(providing example of typical fraudulent inducement scenario).
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not the fashion in which the employee was ultimately dis-
charged.' Thus, the employer will continue to retain the unfet-
tered right to fire the employee for any reason and, in fact, can
even misrepresent the reason for the discharge; 5 the employer,
however, will not be able to lie blatantly to the prospective or
current employee who possesses a more lucrative job offer.56 In
effect, to hold that at-will employees cannot sue their employers
on the basis of fraudulent inducement denies the employees a
remedy afforded other tort victims outside the at-will employ-
ment context and immunizes dishonest employers from liability
for their intentional fraudulent conduct.' Accordingly, appropri-
ately pleaded fraudulent inducement claims ought to be recog-
nized within the sphere of at-will employment.
Pamela A. Nadler*
See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 298, 448 N.E.2d
86, 87, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233 (1983) (stating that at-will employee was allegedly
fired for informing employer he had become aware of "illegal account manipula-
tions"); Zolotar v. New York Life Ins. Co., 172 A.D.2d 27, 29, 576 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851
(1st Dep't 1991) (noting that employer informed employee he was terminated with-
out cause when employer actually had cause); Dalton v. Union Bank of Switzerland,
134 A.D.2d 174, 175-76, 520 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765-66 (1st Dep't 1987) (stating that
plaintiff was discharged because he was not bringing in profits); cf. Serow v. Xerox
Corp., 166 A.D.2d 917, 918, 560 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (4th Dep't 1990) (indicating that
employer of at-will employee has no fiduciary duty to reveal that any admissions
employee made during investigation would not be disclosed to district attorney).
See Lazar, 909 P.2d at 987 (stating that employer can be outright deceptive
about reason for termination because employer has "[the] power to accomplish [it]
forthrightly") (emphasis added).
See id. (noting that "the alleged perpetrator of the fraud lacks the power to
accomplish his objective without resort to duplicity") (emphasis added).
57 See Shaddix v. United Ins. Co. of America, 678 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995) ("Any other result would allow ... employers to defraud their employees
with impunity, relying upon the employment-at-will doctrine to provide them with
virtual immunity in actions arising within the scope of the employment contract.");
Adams & Skidmore, Jr., supra note 24, at B7 (" 'To hold otherwise would give em-
ployers carte blanche to make fraudulent promises of job security to induce indi-
viduals into short-term employment.' ") (quoting Franz v. Iolab Inc., 801 F. Supp.
1537, 1542 (E.D. La. 1992)).
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